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THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT: 
CAN AUSTRALIA PROHIBIT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE? 
Katy A. King† 
Abstract: Both the United States and Australia have federal legislation, the 
Defense of Marriage Act1 and the Marriage Amendment Act 2004,2 that defines marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman.  Australia has an express provision in its 
constitution granting Parliament the authority to pass laws on the subject of marriage.  
The United States, however, has no such constitutional provision.  Consequently, 
Australia’s express constitutional provision may lead the High Court of Australia to rule 
that the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 is constitutional, which would likely preclude 
Australia’s states and territories from passing local same-sex marriage acts.  This is 
fundamentally different than in the United States, where powers regarding marriage are 
reserved to the states.  Therefore, even if the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the Defense of 
Marriage Act, laws that authorize same-sex marriage remain valid in states such as 
Massachusetts.3  Passing a law legalizing same-sex marriage in an Australian state, 
however, may force the issue before the High Court.  A ruling upholding the 
constitutionality of the law may give Parliament the incentive to use its expressly granted 
constitutional authority to tighten restrictions on marriage and marriage-like entities even 
further.  Therefore, same-sex proponents in Australia should approach the issue more 
gingerly than same-sex proponents in the United States.  Instead of attempting to pass 
state same-sex marriage provisions and forcing a decision before the Australian High 
Court, supporters of commonwealth or state same-sex marriage laws should indirectly 
pressure Parliament to overturn the Marriage Amendment Act.  In addition, they should 
continue to push for domestic-partnership protections at the state and commonwealth 
level.   
I. INTRODUCTION    
February 2004 was an exhilarating month for gay and lesbian couples 
in both Australia and the United States.  On February 12, Mayor Gavin 
Newsom of San Francisco, California, authorized the city clerk to begin 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.4  Similarly, on February 15, 
approximately three hundred gay and lesbian couples tied the knot in 
Melbourne, Australia, in what organizers claimed was the world’s largest 
same-sex commitment ceremony.5 On February 22, two thousand people 
crammed into San Francisco’s Hyatt Regency for a giant wedding reception 
                                           
†
 Juris doctor expected in 2007, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Peter Nicolas for his guidance on this topic.  All errors and omissions are the author’s own. 
1
 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000). 
2
 No. 126, sched. 1 (Austl.) 
3
 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457, 
466 (1998) (discussing, in part, that DOMA did not intend to change state law). 
4
 182 Days, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2004, at A16.   
5
 Same-Sex Wedding Fever, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/15/1076779837706.html. 
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honoring the thousands of same-sex couples that had been married over the 
past eleven days.6 
What started as a flurry of hope and an attempt to draw attention to 
the lack of legal recognition for same-sex couples7 ended with 
disappointment for many.  On February 24, President George W. Bush called 
for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.8  On 
May 27, Prime Minister John Howard introduced legislation into Parliament 
to ban same-sex marriage in Australia.9  While on July 15 the U.S. Senate 
defeated the Bush administration’s attempt to ban same-sex marriage, on 
August 12, the California Supreme Court voided the 3,955 marriages that 
had taken place in San Francisco during the previous February and March.10  
On August 13, Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament approved legislation 
defining marriage as a union of a man and a woman.11 
Both the United States and Australia have federal legislation defining 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman.  In 1996, the Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) became law in the United States.12  DOMA both 
defines marriage as between only a man and a woman for federal purposes, 
and asserts that no state shall be required to recognize same-sex marriages 
from other states.13  Similarly, in 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament 
passed the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (“Marriage Amendment Act”).  
The Marriage Amendment Act inserted language into the Marriage Act 1961 
defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman.14  While the plain 
language of these laws appears similar, the U.S. Constitution differs from the 
Australian Constitution.  President Bush desired a constitutional amendment 
to ban same-sex marriage at the federal and state levels, whereas Australia’s 
constitution already gives Parliament the express authority to pass binding 
laws on the topic of marriage.  This difference may affect the impact of 
federal legislation defining marriage. 
The actual effects of these two laws are similar in many ways.  In 
Australia, states can allow de facto relationships that grant unmarried 
couples state benefits equal to those granted married couples; states also 
                                           
6
 See 182 Days, supra note 4.  
7
 See Same-Sex Wedding Fever, supra note 5. 
8
 See 182 Days, supra note 4.  
9
 Stand Up for Our Rights, PM Plans to Ban Same Sex Marriage, NEW SOUTH WALES COUNCIL FOR 
CIVIL LIBERTIES,  available at http://www.nswccl.org.au/issues/glbt.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
10
 See 182 Days, supra note 4. 
11
 Coalition, Labor Pass Same-Sex Marriage Ban, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
ONLINE, Aug. 13, 2004, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200408/s1176303.htm. 
12
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potentially can pass civil-union laws.15  These couples, however, will be 
excluded from federal laws that cover superannuation,16 immigration, and 
taxation.17  There is debate over whether Australian states, like U.S. states, 
have the authority to pass same-sex marriage laws.18 In the United States, 
states can authorize same-sex marriage, but those couples are denied federal 
benefits to which other couples are entitled.19 
Due to differences between the two countries’ constitutions, however, 
the strategy that same-sex marriage proponents use to attempt to legalize 
same-sex marriage should be different.  In the United States, a ruling 
upholding the legality of DOMA from the Supreme Court will continue to 
limit federal benefits for same-sex couples and the right to have a same-sex 
marriage recognized in another state.  DOMA does not, and cannot, prevent 
states like Massachusetts from legalizing same-sex marriage; the U.S. 
Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to pass laws regarding 
marriage.  On the other hand, because the Australian constitution does 
expressly authorize Parliament to pass laws regarding marriage, it is riskier 
for proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia to force a decision by the 
High Court; a judicial determination that the Marriage Amendment Act is 
                                           
15
 Donna Cooper, For Richer For Poorer, In Sickness and In Health: Should Australia Embrace 
Same-Sex Marriage?, AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. Lexis 7, *22 (2005) (discussing Queensland’s 
Discrimination Law Amendment Act (2002) (Austl.) that includes same-sex partners in the definition of de 
facto partners.  Id.  In addition, Cooper declares that the “2004 amendments to the Marriage Act occurred at 
a time when there had been strong legislative trends throughout Australia, at both Commonwealth and State 
and Territory level, to develop to same-sex couples the same rights as married couples in many other areas 
of the law.”  Id. at *19.  In 2006, the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) attempted to pass a civil-union 
law.  See, e.g., Michael Perry, Australian Territory to Allow Gay Civil Marriages, REUTERS, Mar. 29, 2006, 
available at http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-03-
29T042531Z_01_SYD21282_RTRUKOC_0_UK-AUSTRALIA-HOMOSEXUAL.xml.  ACT proposed a 
civil-union law that would have given same-sex couples the same rights in the territory as married couples.  
However, the act would not have, affected national laws that govern taxation, superannuation, and health 
care.  Id.  In June 2006, however, the governor-general struck down ACT’s civil-union legislation on the 
advice of Prime Minister Howard.  No Wedding Bells: John Howard Blocks Canberra’s Gay Marriages, 
ECONOMIST, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id= 
7067408.  At the time of publication of this comment, it is unclear what will happen next in the conflict 
between the commonwealth and the states and territories. 
16
 Superannuation in Australia is similar to the United States’ Social Security program.  A mandatory 
contribution from workers’ wages to a superannuation scheme provides for workers upon retirement.  It 
also provides for their dependents upon death.  Jenny Millbank & Kathy Sant, A Bride in her Every-Day 




 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 15 (discussing state bills in Tasmania and New South Wales that, if 
passed, purport to legalize same-sex marriage); Rodney Croome, Marching Under the Banner of Marriage, 
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, May 11, 2005 (arguing that the Marriage Amendment Act clearly indicates that the 
federal marriage law deals only with different-sex marriage, leaving open the door for states to pass non-
contradictory same-sex marriage laws that would operate in a different field).     
19
 Andrew Koppelman, Dumb And Doma: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997). 
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constitutional would allow Parliament to exercise its express constitutional 
authority to regulate marriage at both the federal and state levels.  This could 
result in Australian states being precluded from passing laws authorizing 
equality for same-sex couples. 
For same-sex marriage proponents in Australia, a ruling upholding the 
legality of the Marriage Amendment Act from the High Court would not 
only eliminate same-sex marriage at the commonwealth level, but also 
eliminate same-sex marriage at the state level.  Section 109 of the Australian 
Constitution likely prevents individual states and territories from legalizing 
same-sex marriage, as commonwealth legislation supersedes any conflicting 
state legislation.20  A ruling upholding the commonwealth’s exclusive 
jurisdiction on marriage could lead to legislation that even further curtails 
equality of same-sex couples.  In December 2005, Prime Minister Howard 
expressed his views on same-sex partnerships, declaring, “I believe very 
strongly that marriage is exclusively a union for life of a man and a woman 
to the exclusion of others. That’s the common understanding of marriage in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, and I would be opposed to the recognition of 
civil unions.”"21  The views of highly influential politicians such as the 
prime minister, in addition to a High Court ruling upholding the prohibition 
on same-sex marriage, could lead to an even greater push for legislation 
restricting the rights of same-sex couples. 
If the Marriage Amendment Act is challenged, some arguments 
suggest that the High Court would strike down the act as a violation of the 
Australian Constitution.  Other arguments suggest, however, that the court 
would uphold the legislation.22  Based on this uncertainty, Australians 
interested in promoting same-sex marriage should lobby Parliament to 
amend the marriage definition and continue working to strengthen state and 
commonwealth domestic-partnership laws.  Challenging the Marriage 
Amendment Act directly through the passage of potentially conflicting state 
laws might trigger litigation resulting in an unfavorable judicial 
determination by the High Court. 
This comment analyzes different approaches to regulating marriage in 
the United States and Australia and assesses the similarities and differences 
of federal legislation and its effect at the state level.  Section II lays out the 
                                           
20
 AUSTL. CONST. § 109.  “Inconsistency of laws – When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law 
of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.”  Id. 
21
 Australians Back Same-Sex Civil Unions, ANGUS REID GLOBAL SCAN:  POLLS AND RESEARCH.  
February 20, 2006, available at http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/ 
10947. 
22
 See infra Part III. 
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background and history of DOMA in the United States and the Marriage 
Amendment Act in Australia.  Section III analyzes the likelihood the High 
Court of Australia would uphold the Marriage Amendment Act if the act 
were attacked on its constitutionality.  Section IV argues that if the High 
Court upholds the legality of the Marriage Amendment Act, then the High 
Court likely also will rule that the law is binding on the states; state same-
sex legislation will be struck down as conflicting with commonwealth 
legislation.  Section V proposes that same-sex marriage proponents in 
Australia should take a tactically different approach than same-sex marriage 
proponents in the United States due to the differences in the constitutions 
and the ramifications of an adverse court decision.  Instead of pushing for a 
state same-sex marriage law that could conflict with the commonwealth law 
and trigger a restrictive High Court ruling, proponents of same-sex marriage 
in Australia should continue to advocate for civil unions as well as lobby 
Parliament and high-powered public officers, such as the prime minister, for 
a reversal of the Marriage Amendment Act. 
II. BACKGROUND:  THE SCOPE OF DOMA UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
VERSUS THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT 
UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
The scope of DOMA within the United States differs from the scope 
of the Marriage Amendment Act in Australia.  In the United States, DOMA 
applies to marriage only for federal purposes; states retain the power to 
regulate marriage for state purposes.  In Australia, however, Parliament has 
the express constitutional authority to pass laws regulating marriage.23  As a 
result, the Marriage Amendment Act may be binding on the states as well as 
the commonwealth. 
A. The U.S. Congress Likely Does Not Have the Authority to Expand 
DOMA’s Scope to Restrict States’ Ability to Pass Same-Sex Marriage 
Laws 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed DOMA, which has two main 
functions.  First, DOMA defines the word marriage as a legal union between 
only a man and a woman for purposes of determining the meaning of any 
Act of Congress.24  Secondly, DOMA gives authority to all states of the 
United States to refuse to give effect to any record or proceeding from 
                                           
23
 AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxi).   
24
 1 U.S.C § 7 (2000). 
142 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
another state respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex.25  
DOMA does not attempt to define marriage as the union between only a man 
and a woman for nonfederal purposes, i.e., it does not attempt to demand 
that the states also define marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union.  
The recognition that regulation of domestic relations belongs exclusively to 
the states shapes the content and structure of family law in the United 
States.26  Therefore, in order for the U.S. government to bind states to a 
certain definition of marriage, there would likely first need to be a 
constitutional amendment either granting Congress the authority to pass such 
legislation or, in the alternative, stripping state courts of the power to create 
or extend legal status and benefits for same-sex partners.27   
1. The U.S. Congress Has Limited Power to Pass Laws Regulating 
Marriage  
Although the issue is still debated, the U.S. Congress likely does not 
have the authority to mandate the definition of marriage for state purposes.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the “whole subject of the 
domestic relations of a husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the 
laws of the states, and not the laws of the United States.”28  On the rare 
occasions when state family law has conflicted with a federal statute, the 
Supreme Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause29 to 
determine whether Congress has “positively required by direct enactment” 
that state law be preempted.30  A state family law must do “major damage” 
to “clear and substantial” federal interests before the Court will invalidate 
it.31 
                                           
25
 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).  
26
 See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
27
 Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in 
Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137 (2004). 
28
 Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94.   
29
 U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.  “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything 
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”  Id.   
30
 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1904) (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 
77). 
31
 Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).  But see 
Koppelman, supra note 19, at n.25.  Koppelman argues that the Hisquierdo test has never been described 
by the Court as a constitutional limitation on Congress, but instead as merely a guide to statutory 
construction.  The “major damage” prong has been toothless and has had little influence on even the 
interpretation of any federal statute.  However, if the law’s purpose is illegitimate, “the law is already 
invalid.”  Id.  
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No express authority exists under the U.S. Constitution for Congress 
to pass laws regulating marriage.32  The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to 
the states respectively, or to the people.33  For example, in striking down the 
civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act,34 the Supreme 
Court noted that “the Constitution requires a distinction between what is 
truly national and what is truly local.”35  Reiterating that every law passed by 
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution,36 the Supreme Court declared that if the Court accepted the 
petitioner’s reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce 
Clause37 to legislate on gender-motivated violence, then that same rationale  
apply to family law issues such as marriage, divorce, and childrearing.38  In 
declaring those arenas “areas of traditional state regulation,”39 the Court held 
that the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
exceeded the scope of Congress’ authority to pass legislation.40 
Nevertheless, the validity of the assertion that states retain plenary 
governmental authority to regulate family matters is not entirely certain.41  
Federal laws increasingly regulate family relations.42  Without a 
constitutional amendment, however, the Court almost certainly will 
determine that powers regarding marriage are reserved to the states.  
Proponents of a federal law defining marriage as a union between only a 
man and a woman call for a constitutional amendment, rather than mere 
legislation.43  In 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the 
                                           
32
 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
33
 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
34
 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
35
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.  
36
 Id. at 607 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution 
is written”)).   
37
 Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress shall have the authority “to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
38
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16. 
39
 Id. at 615. 
40
 Id. at 627. 
41
 See Wardle, supra note 27, at 168-71. 
42
 Examples of the federalization of family law include regulation of child support, abortion, family 
planning and birth control, foster care and adoption, health insurance for dependents, family violence, 
family leave policies, and parental rights.  Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a 
Quest for Policy, 33 FAM. L. Q. 843, 847-48 (1999).  See also Norman N. Robbins, The “Feds” Are Still 
Coming, 31 MICH. FAM. L.J. 4 (2002). 
43
 Wardle, supra note 27, at 139.  “The choice is clear—either in the next dozen years there will be a 
constitutional rule protecting the institution of conjugal marriage, or there will be a constitutional rule 
144 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
Federal Marriage Amendment in an attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution 
to define marriage as the union between only a man and a woman.44  The 
same bill was introduced into the Senate the following year.45  While neither 
bill has passed, the fact that opponents of same-sex marriage believe they 
need to amend the U.S. Constitution strongly suggests that there is no 
existing constitutional authority for Congress to pass laws defining marriage 
at the state level.   
2. The Scope of DOMA in the United States Does Not Include Mandating 
That States Define Marriage as Between a Man and a Woman  
Despite the jurisprudence indicating that family arrangements are a 
“peculiarly state province,”46 DOMA was passed by the U.S. Congress in 
1996.47  DOMA, however, only defines marriage for federal purposes; it 
does not attempt to require states to define marriage as between only a man 
and a woman.48 
DOMA has two parts, “each designed to perform a different 
function.”49  One part, 1 U.S.C. § 7, declares that “in determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. . . .”50  The 
second part, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, asserts that no state “shall be required to 
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State 
. . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated 
as a marriage under the laws of such other State. . . .”51  This means that 
marriage is defined as between a man and a woman, only for federal 
purposes, in the determination of any benefit, privilege, or obligation 
attributed to marriage through legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.52  In 
                                                                                                                              
forcing all states to create or to recognize—and effectively leading to domestic approval of—same-sex 
marriage.  The choice is inevitable.  There is, and will be, no middle ground.”  Id. at 198.   
44
 H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002).  The full text of the proposed bill:  “Marriage in the United 
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.  Neither this Constitution or the constitution 
of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.”  Id. 
45
 S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). 
46
 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966).  
47




 Mark P. Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Lawrence 
Jurisprudence:  Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 421, 421 (2005).   
50
 1 U.S.C. § 7.   
51
 28 U.S.C. §1738C.   
52
 See Strasser, supra note 49, at 421-22, 436-37. 
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addition, DOMA allows states to refuse to honor same-sex marriages from 
other states, negating any Full Faith and Credit Clause claim for this issue.53     
Since the passage of DOMA, many commentators have argued that 
the U.S. Supreme Court could (or should) rule that DOMA exceeds 
Congress’s power to legislate,54 violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution, and/or violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution.55  Unless the Supreme Court itself declares DOMA 
unconstitutional, however, lower courts will likely continue to uphold its key 
provisions.56  As of October 2006, arguments regarding the constitutionality 
of DOMA have not been heard at the Supreme Court level.     
However, even a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the 
constitutionality of DOMA would not affect the ability of states to legislate 
and enforce same-sex marriage laws within that state.  In 2003, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has left 
open as a matter of federal law whether states have the authority to bar 
same-sex couples from civil marriage.57  Even if the U.S. Constitution would 
allow a state to prohibit same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts court 
determined in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health58 that its own state 
constitution “is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and 
equality than the Federal Constitution . . . [and] may demand broader 
protection for fundamental rights. . . .”59  After careful analysis, the court 
held that “barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and 
                                           
53
 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000); see generally Strasser, supra note 3. 
54
 See Strasser, supra note 49, at 439.  Strasser argues that DOMA is not merely defining who will 
receive federal marriage benefits but instead is trying to modify state regulation of family law.  Congress is 
overstepping its authority if it attempts to define marriage to determine who qualifies for federal benefits 
and allows states to define marriage for state purposes.  The scope of a federal right is a federal question, 
but its content still may be determined by state law.  State law is especially important to apply “where a 
[federal] statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is 
primarily a matter of state concern.”  Id. (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)).  But see 
Koppelman, supra note 19, at 4 n.25.  Koppelman asserts that “[o]nly the federal incidents of marriage are 
withheld as a result of DOMA’s definition.”  Id. 
55
 See Koppelman, supra note 19; Strasser, supra note 49; Emily J. Sack, The Retreat from DOMA:  
The Public Policy of Same-Sex Marriage and a Theory of Congressional Power Under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 507 (2005).    
56
 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp. 2d 1298 (2005).  The United States District Court, M.D. 
Florida, Tampa Division, dismissed plaintiff’s argument that the U.S. Supreme Court is “likely to declare 
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right that is protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 1309.  The 
district court stated that it will not create such a fundamental right before the Supreme Court revisits the 
issue of same-sex marriage and asserted that the higher courts have not acknowledged or established a 
constitutional right to enter into same-sex marriage.  Id.  The district court also held that its role is to follow 
precedent of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, not to overturn precedent by 
striking down DOMA.  Id. 
57




 Id. at 313. 
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obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a 
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”60 
Because Congress currently has no authority to prohibit a state from 
passing laws affecting same-sex marriage, the federal government cannot 
pass legislation to stop Massachusetts from granting such marriages without 
passing a constitutional amendment.  DOMA does, however, allow other 
states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages from Massachusetts.  In 
2005, a federal court in Florida upheld the State’s refusal to recognize a 
Massachusetts marriage license.61  Even within Massachusetts, however, the 
impact of DOMA on a same-sex married couple is harsh “since at a stroke it 
deprives them of all the federal benefits to which other married couples are 
entitled.”62  Under DOMA, same-sex spouses are unable to file federal joint 
tax returns;63 are excluded from the federal employees’ health-benefits 
program64 and the federal employees’ life-insurance program;65 are not 
entitled as widows or widowers to compensation for the work-related death 
of a federal employee;66 and are unable to receive spousal benefits under the 
Social Security Act’s old age, survivors, and disability-insurance program.67  
In 1997, the General Accounting Office found that over one thousand federal 
laws contained benefits, rights, and privileges contingent on marital status.68  
DOMA excludes same-sex couples from the protections and benefits of 
these laws.69   
On the other hand, same-sex married couples in Massachusetts are 
eligible for marriage benefits that touch “nearly every aspect of life and 
death.”70  In Massachusetts, marriage benefits include joint state income tax 
filing;71 tenancy by the entirety, which provides protections against creditors 
and allows for the automatic descent of property to the surviving spouse 
without probate;72 automatic rights to inherit the property of a deceased 
                                           
60
 Id. at 344. 
61
 Wilson, 354 F.Supp. 2d at 1309.  In this case, plaintiffs Nancy Wilson and Paula Schoenwether 
claimed they were legally married in Massachusetts and possessed a valid marriage license.  They allegedly 
presented their marriage license to a deputy clerk of the circuit court, who refused to recognize it.  Id. at 
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spouse that does not leave a will;73 the right to share the medical policy of 
one’s spouse;74 the right to bring claims for wrongful death and loss of 
consortium resulting from tort actions;75 preferential options under the 
state’s pension system;76 evidentiary rights such as the prohibition against 
spouses testifying against one another;77 and the application of predictable 
rules of child custody in the event of a divorce.78  
These rights, however, do not encompass the totality of the benefits of 
marriage.79  In 2004, the Massachusetts Senate sought an advisory opinion 
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding a bill, Senate 
No. 2175, drafted in response to Goodridge.80  The proposed law purported 
to create an institution of civil unions for same-sex couples that would 
provide all of the same “benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities” 
granted to spouses in a marriage, yet be separate from it.81  Even with equal 
protection of tangible benefits, however, the Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the bill maintained “an unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory 
status for same-sex couples. . . .”82  While providing equal specific benefits, 
“[t]he bill would have [had] the effect of maintaining and fostering a stigma 
of exclusion that the [Massachusetts] Constitution prohibits.”83  According 
to the Supreme Judicial Court, the right to participate in the institution of 
civil marriage itself, along with its tangible and intangible protections and 
benefits, exceeds the sum of individual benefits accrued through a civil-
union law.84 
B. Under the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth Has Broader 
Authority to Impose the Definition of Marriage upon the States 
The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901 pursuant to 
an act of British Parliament.85  The Australian Constitution, modeled in some 
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respects on the U.S. Constitution, vests the High Court of Australia with 
jurisdiction over the commonwealth’s powers.86  The Australian Constitution 
gives Parliament the power to make laws with respect to marriage.87 
1. Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament Has Greater Authority to Pass 
Laws Regarding Marriage Than Does the U.S. Congress 
The Commonwealth Parliament has greater authority than the U.S. 
Congress to legislate in the area of marriage because the Australian 
Constitution explicitly gives the Commonwealth Parliament the authority to 
“make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
commonwealth with respect to: . . . [m]arriage.”88  In addition, a law at the 
commonwealth level is binding upon states where state law conflicts with 
the commonwealth’s law.  Section 109 of the Australian Constitution states, 
“[w]hen a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the commonwealth, the 
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.”89   
2. The Scope of the Marriage Amendment Act in Australia is Broader 
Than That of DOMA 
In August 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia passed 
the Marriage Amendment Act, which amended the Marriage Act 1961 in 
several substantial respects.90  In section 5(1), the Marriage Amendment Act 
inserted the text “[marriage] means the union of a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”91  In addition, at the 
end of section 88B, the Amendment added “(4) To avoid doubt, in this Part 
(including section 88E) marriage has the meaning given by subsection 
5(1).”92  And lastly, after section 88E, the Amendment added “[c]ertain 
unions are not marriages.  A union solemnized in a foreign country between: 
(a) a man and another man; or (b) a woman and another woman; must not be 
[recognized] as a marriage in Australia.”93  
Australian states that favor equality of benefits for same-sex couples 
have other viable options for legal recognition under state law.  For example, 
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in Tasmania, the Relationships Act gives registered same-sex couples status 
equal to married couples under nearly all state laws, including property 
transfers and state superannuation.94  In December 2005, the Australian 
Capital Territory (“ACT”) announced that it was drafting legislation to 
provide for civil unions in the territory.95  Jon Stanhope, chief minister of 
ACT stated, “Civil unions will deliver real, functional equality under ACT 
law for couples who either do not have access to the commonwealth 
Marriage Act or who prefer not to marry.”96  The civil-union act would have 
allowed same-sex couples to join in civil unions as freely as opposite-sex 
couples, and would have resulted in the same legal recognition for partners 
in civil unions as for married couples.97  However, while civil unions in the 
ACT would have been available for all Australians, such unions would have 
been valid only in the ACT and would not have affected national laws 
governing taxation, superannuation, and health care.98  With such 
understanding, the Civil Unions Act99 passed in the legislative assembly in 
2006, giving formal recognition to same-sex partnerships.100  However, the 
success of the Act was short lived; it was rejected by the governor-general 
before the first same-sex couple entered into a civil union.101  “On June 13th 
Michael Jeffrey, the governor-general, who represents Queen Elizabeth, 
Australia’s head of state, rejected the law on [Prime Minister] Howard’s 
advice.  Mr. Howard argues the ACT’s law unacceptably equates gay civil 
unions with marriage.”102  At the time of this comment’s publication, the 
ACT government planned to revive “its plan to make same-sex unions legal 
in the territory as the federal Government reassesses legal discrimination 
against homosexuals.”103 
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III. THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA IS LIKELY TO FIND THAT THE 
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT DOES NOT EXCEED PARLIAMENT’S 
AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS WITH RESPECT TO MARRIAGE 
If the Marriage Amendment Act is challenged, the High Court of 
Australia is likely to find it was within the constitutional authority of 
Parliament to pass the Marriage Amendment Act.  On its face, it appears that 
the constitutional analysis of the Marriage Amendment Act under Australian 
law is more straightforward than the analysis of DOMA under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Marriage is one of the forty enumerated subjects on which the 
commonwealth is authorized to legislate.104  Thus, it appears that it was 
within the constitutional authority of Parliament to pass the Marriage 
Amendment Act.  However, statutory interpretation in Australia traditionally 
required that words be interpreted according to their meaning at the time the 
legislation was passed.105  Possibly, therefore, the interpretation of marriage 
may be limited to what that word meant when the constitution was adopted 
in 1900.106  Thus, it is arguable that Parliament cannot legislate on the topic 
of same-sex marriage because the term marriage was not interpreted to 
encompass same-sex marriage in 1900.  If the word marriage in the 
constitution refers only to heterosexual marriage, then same-sex marriages 
could be authorized by state legislation.107  However, “the purpose of 
granting power to the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to 
marriage was to make possible uniform national regulation of a vitally 
important legal relationship. . . .”  It is difficult to predict how the High 
Court may rule on same-sex marriage, in part because “High Court decisions 
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on the express and implied rights in the Australian Constitution have been 
neither consistent nor coherent.”108 
This confusion and uncertainty led both New South Wales and 
Tasmania to introduce same-sex marriage bills in their state legislatures 
providing for marriage between adults of the same sex.109  Although the 
Marriage Amendment Act was already in force, Tasmania introduced the 
Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2005, Same-Sex Marriage (Celebrant and 
Registration) Bill, and Same-Sex Marriage (Dissolution and Annulment) Bill 
2005 on April 12, 2005.110  In New South Wales, legislation of the same title 
was introduced into the Legislative Council on May 4, 2005.111 
While there are convincing arguments both for and against upholding 
the constitutionality of the Marriage Amendment Act, the High Court will 
likely determine that Parliament does have the power to define marriage as 
exclusively the union between a man and a woman, effectively prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.  However, the question is unresolved.  The issue, 
therefore, is determining, “on what side of the line does extending the 
marriage power to same-sex marriages fall?”112 
A. Some Arguments Suggest the High Court Will Determine That the 
Commonwealth Parliament Does Not Have the Authority to Pass 
Laws Touching Upon Same-Sex Marriage 
1. Parliament Does Not Have the Authority to Define Constitutional 
Terms. 
Under Australian law, Parliament lacks authority to define terms 
because no law can give power to any body, other than a court, to determine 
conclusively any issue upon which the constitutional validity of the law 
depends.113  This doctrine is often metaphorically described by the maxim 
“the stream cannot rise above its source.”114  While the historic record 
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implies that the constitution framers believed the High Court would possess 
the final word on constitutional powers, no specific case points to this 
authority.115  The decision in Australian Communist Party v. 
Commonwealth116 is considered to be the closest to a declaration of such 
power and, therefore, is arguably the Australian equivalent of Marbury v. 
Madison117 in the United States.118  When a law is clearly within the 
legislature’s authority, some Australian judges may allow the legislature 
leeway in conferring power on public servants.119  However, when the 
legislative power’s source is at issue, the courts must be concerned with the 
separation of power between the commonwealth and the states; “similar 
latitude should not be allowed to the Commonwealth Parliament or 
government regarding determination of those questions.”120  As a result of 
this doctrine, the Parliament does not have the authority to assert a 
conclusive determination of constitutional law.121  Except during times of 
war when laws have deference power, the constitutional validity of a law 
cannot be made to depend upon the opinion of the Parliament.122  Thus, as 
the court quipped in Communist Party,123 the “power to make laws with 
respect to lighthouses does not authorize the making of a law with respect to 
anything which is, in the opinion of the lawmaker, a lighthouse.”124  
This interpretation of legislative authority could have a substantial 
impact on any potential High Court decision on the constitutionality of the 
Marriage Amendment Act.  Like the lighthouse analogy, Parliament clearly 
has the authority under section 51 (xxi) to make laws with respect to 
marriage,125  but this does not mean that Parliament may make laws with 
respect to anything that is, in the opinion of the lawmaker, a marriage.  If the 
High Court determined that the term marriage in the constitution referred to 
a union between only a man and a woman, i.e., its traditional meaning at the 
time the constitution was adopted, then the commonwealth Parliament 
would have the authority to regulate only opposite-sex marriages.  
Parliament would not, therefore, have the authority to pass a law either 
allowing or prohibiting same-sex marriages.  If this determination is made, 
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the Marriage Amendment Act will either be interpreted simply as providing 
a partial definition of marriage that does not conflict with a state’s inclusion 
of same-sex marriage or will be struck down entirely.  In order to evaluate 
this possibility, it is important to analyze the scope of the traditional 
interpretation of marriage, as understood at the time the constitution was 
written. 
2. Under the Orthodox Principles of Legal Interpretation, Parliament 
May Only Have the Authority to Pass Laws on Marriage as It Was 
Understood at the Time the Constitution was Written 
While marriage is a subject of power granted to the commonwealth,126 
“[a]ccording to the orthodox rules of [Australian] legal interpretation, the 
meaning to be given to a term is that which it had at the date of the 
enactment,”127 in this case, the 1900 constitution.  Historically, the High 
Court looked at the connotation of a term, which is equivalent to the essence 
or nature of the meaning of the term.128  The specifics of a term may change 
over time, for instance the term vehicle logically expanded to cover electric 
cars or water jet-skis, even though these “vehicles” did not exist in 1900.    
However, if the word vehicle suddenly became the term used to describe 
drug paraphernalia, a provision in the constitution that discussed vehicles 
would not automatically expand to use of illegal drugs.   
[I]n the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or 
connotations of its words should remain constant.  We are not to 
give words a meaning different from any meaning which they 
could have borne in 1900.  Law is to be accommodated to 
changing facts.  It is not to be changed as language changes.129 
Therefore, in order for the High Court to “retain the confidence of the 
Australian people . . . [it must not] travel beyond what the text and structure 
of the Constitution can reasonably support.”130  Strict originalism is 
motivated “by a proper respect for people in the present—namely, the 
electors of Australia and their elected representatives, who, pursuant to 
[section] 128 of the Constitution, have exclusive authority to change their 
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own Constitution.”131  The original meaning, therefore, must be the starting 
point for current interpretation. 
The principle of originalism could be applied to the High Court’s 
determination whether Parliament has the authority to pass federal laws 
regarding same-sex marriage.  “In 1901, ‘marriage’ was seen as meaning a 
voluntary union for life between one man and one woman to the exclusion of 
all others.”132  This definition was offered in 1866 by Lord Penzance in Hyde 
v. Hyde133 and accepted in Australia in 1901.134  If that interpretation of the 
term was accepted today, it would deny Parliament the authority to legislate 
regarding same-sex marriages, because same-sex marriage is outside the 
scope of the term’s original meaning.135  As a corollary, if the connotation of 
marriage in 1900 only encompassed opposite-sex couples, then Parliament 
also does not have the authority to prohibit same-sex marriage.  Only if the 
constitutional marriage power extends to same-sex unions does Parliament 
have the power to pass laws authorizing or denying same-sex marriage at all.  
Ironically, in order to ban same-sex marriage, Parliament would need to 
depend on the definition of marriage to include same-sex marriage.136 
The High Court has not ruled directly on the topic of the definition of 
marriage in the constitution in any detail.137  It is unclear “whether, for the 
purpose of the constitution, marriage should be given the definition it had in 
1901, when the constitution came into effect, or in 1961, when the Marriage 
Act was passed, or whether it should have its contemporary, everyday 
meaning.”138  The High Court judges’ opinions on the authority of 
Parliament vary widely.  Justice Brennan takes a view that it is “beyond the 
powers of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for any other form of 
marriage” besides that encompassed by the Hyde definition.139  At the other 
extreme, Justice McHugh states “arguably marriage now means, or in the 
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near future may mean, a voluntary union for life between two people to the 
exclusion of others.”140 
The Marriage Amendment Act defines marriage as between a man and 
a woman but does not explicitly prohibit marriage as between same-sex 
couples, perhaps unintentionally vacating the field of same-sex marriages.  If 
the High Court determines that the term marriage is confined to opposite-sex 
couples, then Parliament would be unable to override any state legislation 
authorizing same-sex marriage, because the commonwealth’s power would 
not extend to the subject matter.141  If the commonwealth has the authority to 
pass laws only with respect to opposite-sex marriages, section 109 (the 
Australian equivalent to the U.S. Supremacy Clause142) will be inapplicable.  
The commonwealth’s law prevails only “to the extent of the 
inconsistency,”143 but if the commonwealth’s law addresses marriage 
involving only opposite-sex couples, and states create additional categories 
that also qualify as marriage, there is technically no inconsistency.  This 
leaves room for the states to choose whether to pass legislation on the 
matter.144  A state law defining marriage between same-sex couples is 
operative to all persons not covered by Parliament’s definition.  If a state 
attempted to legislate that marriage did not include opposite-sex couples, 
then there would be a conflict between the state and commonwealth laws, 
and the state law would be invalid.  A state law, however, becomes 
inoperative because of inconsistency only to the extent of that inconsistency. 
If the High Court determines that Parliament is restricted to passing 
laws regarding marriage exclusively with respect to unions between a man 
and a woman, then the states should be able to pass supplementary 
legislation further defining marriage as also a union between two people of 
the same sex.  Because the topic of marriage shares concurrent jurisdiction 
with both the states and the commonwealth, a same-sex couple married 
under a valid state law could be entitled to all of the privileges and 
responsibilities of marriage throughout the commonwealth.145 
                                           
140
 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 553 (McHugh, J.) (emphasis in original); 
Nicholson, supra note 133, at 563. 
141
 Goldsworthy, supra note 105, at 700.   
142
 U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2, see supra note 29 for text of Supremacy Clause. 
143
 Austl. Const. § 109. 
144
 See P. H. Lane, Some Principles and Sources of Australian Constitutional Law 224 (1964). 
145
 AUSTL. CONST. § 118.  Section 118 of the constitution states, “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given, 
throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of 
every State.”  Id.  
156 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
B. In the Alternative, Arguments Suggest the High Court Will Determine 
That the Commonwealth Parliament Has the Authority to Pass a Law 
Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage 
While there are some arguments to suggest that the High Court may 
find that Parliament did not have the authority to pass the Marriage 
Amendment Act, it is more likely that the court will determine that 
Parliament does possess the constitutional authority to legislate on matters 
regarding same-sex marriage.  Before Parliament enacted the Marriage 
Amendment Act, same-sex marriage proponents in Australia persuasively 
argued that the term marriage in section 51(xxi) of the constitution 
encompasses same-sex marriage and therefore Parliament has the authority 
to legalize same-sex marriage at the commonwealth level.146  It has been 
argued that the constitution was “set completely free in 1901 from the 
intentions, beliefs and wishes of those who drafted it so that it is viewed by 
each succeeding generation of Australians with the eyes of their own 
times.”147  That argument may now come back to haunt those proponents 
because, if true, the logical extension of Parliament having the authority 
under section 51(xxi) to legalize same-sex marriage is that Parliament may 
also have the authority to prohibit it.148 
Parliamentary powers listed in section 51 grant plenary powers which 
are “to be construed with all the generality that its words will admit.”149  The 
High Court has adopted a broad interpretation for construing the 
commonwealth powers listed in section 51 of the constitution.150  Each of 
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the powers granted in section 51 “can support not only laws which operate 
directly on the subject matter of the paragraph in question but also laws 
which do not operate directly but which can be seen as incidental to the 
power.”151  Legislative power “carries with it power to make laws governing 
or affecting many matters that are incidental or ancillary to the subject 
matter.”152  For example, in 1991, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the 
Political Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1991,153 which introduced 
Part IIID into the Broadcasting Act 1942.154  In Australian Capital Television 
Proprietary Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, the plaintiffs sought 
declarations that Part IIID was invalid.155  While the plaintiffs claimed 
several constitutional violations, they accepted “that the legislative powers 
conferred by [section] 51(v) with respect to ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic 
and other like services’ . . . on the Parliament by the Constitution . . . would 
support the Act.”156  Their concession is strong indication that section 51 
powers are typically interpreted broadly.  By similar measure, it is probable 
that the High Court will interpret the term marriage broadly, as it also is a 
section 51 plenary grant of power to Parliament.  If construed generally, the 
ability to prohibit same-sex marriage likely will be held to affect the subject 
matter of marriage, and, therefore, be constitutional.    
Even cases in which the High Court has held that Parliament exceeded 
its section 51 authority give an indication that the Court likely will conclude 
that the Marriage Amendment Act did not exceed that scope.  The close 
decision in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner provides an example.157  At that 
time, the Industrial Relations Act 1988 allowed a party to a contract to make 
an application to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to review 
the contract to determine if it was unfair, harsh, or against the public’s 
interest.158  The law applied only to contracts that related to “constitutional 
corporations.”159  Parliament based its authority to pass such a law on 
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section 51(xx) of the constitution,160 which gives the commonwealth the 
power to make laws with respect to “foreign corporations, and trading or 
financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth.”  
Four justices of the High Court (Justices Brennan, Dawson, McHugh, and 
Toohey) determined that sections of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 
exceeded the section 51(xx) authority of Parliament to pass such a law.  
Declaring that when a law is too broad it is invalid, Justice Brennan asserted 
that the legislative power conferred by section 51(xx) does not extend to 
things relating to corporations, but instead it confers on the Parliament only 
a power to legislate with respect to the matters enumerated in the section.161  
Justice Toohey declared, “[t]he words ‘with respect to’ require a ‘relevance 
to or connection with the subject assigned to the Commonwealth 
Parliament.’”162  Justice Dawson, however, pointed out that section 51(xx) is 
different from most of the other paragraphs in section 51, as it “describes the 
subject matter of the legislative power which it confers by reference to 
categories of persons, albeit artificial persons, [and therefore] a different 
approach is required in determining whether a law falls within its terms.”163  
Justice Dawson uses the example of a law directed at interstate trade and 
commerce:  “For example, a law directed at interstate trade and commerce 
will be a law upon that subject and so fall within [section] 51(i). But a law 
directed at trading or financial corporations . . . is not necessarily a law upon 
the subject matter of those bodies.”164  Further, Justice McHugh, concerned 
with Parliament legislating outside the scope of the subject matter on which 
it is are authorized to legislate, noted that “as long as the law in question can 
be characterized as a law with respect to trading, financial or foreign 
corporations, the Parliament of the Commonwealth may regulate many 
subject matters that are otherwise outside the scope of Commonwealth 
legislative power.”165  Three justices (Justices Deane, Gaudron, and Chief 
Justice Mason), on the other hand, asserted that the law did not exceed 
Parliament’s authority.166 
The fact that the High Court determined that Parliament did not have 
the authority to pass such a law initially appears to support the argument that 
the court also may not uphold the Marriage Amendment Act because the 
court interpreted Parliament’s authority to pass commonwealth legislation 
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narrowly.  However, section 51(xxi) of the constitution, which gives 
Parliament the power to make laws with respect to marriage, is more similar 
to Dawson’s example of interstate trade and commerce.  Marriage is a 
subject matter over which Parliament has the authority to pass laws.  The 
power is not granted to Parliament by reference to, for instance, married 
persons.  The Marriage Amendment Act clearly impacts the subject matter of 
marriage.  By allowing Parliament to pass a law eliminating same-sex 
marriage, there is no concern that it is regulating a subject matter outside the 
scope of its initial authority.  The ultimate question is whether there is “a 
sufficient connection between the law and the subject matter to be able to 
say that the law is one with respect to that subject matter.”167  A law defining 
the scope of marriage clearly is one with respect to the subject matter of 
marriage. 
Overall, section 51 powers are plenary grants to Parliament and are 
interpreted broadly.  A commonwealth law is likely to be upheld if it 
addresses the subject matter of an entity the constitution explicitly bestowed 
authority upon Parliament to regulate. 
IV. THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT ACT, IF VALID, WILL LIKELY TRUMP ANY 
STATE OR TERRITORY LAW THAT ALLOWS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
If the High Court determines that Parliament possesses the authority 
to pass the Marriage Amendment Act, the court is likely to find that the 
legislation supersedes any contradictory state law.  However, there are at 
least two opposing arguments regarding an Australian state’s authority to 
enact its own same-sex marriage law since the passage of the Marriage 
Amendment Act.   
One argument is that under the Marriage Amendment Act, states have 
no authority at all to pass same-sex marriage laws.168  Under this theory, if 
Tasmania and New South Wales (or any other state) passed bills legalizing 
same-sex marriage at the state level, those laws either would have little or no 
impact upon existing marriage laws, or would be struck down by the High 
Court as conflicting with commonwealth law.169 
                                           
167
 Id. at 353 (Toohey, J.). 
168
 See Nicholson, supra note 133, at 556.  “With very limited exceptions relating, for example, to a 
person’s age or the consanguinity of the parties to a proposed marriage, the legal capacity to marry has 
never been expressly restricted by Australian law.  Recent legislation has changed that position.  The 
Marriage Amendment Act 2004 . . . proscribes both same-sex marriage contracted in Australia and the 
recognition of same-sex marriages validly contracted overseas” (internal citations omitted).  Id. at 556-57. 
169
 Cooper, supra note 15, at *3.  See also, Vegjie Cari & Benjamin Kiely, Comment, The Legal 
Regulation of Marriage – Update, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 569, 572 (2005).  “Purporting to rely on the State’s 
residual marriage power, the Tasmanian Greens tabled the Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2005 (Tas).  However, 
160 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
The second argument is that the Marriage Amendment Act “made 
crystal clear that federal marriage law deals only with different-sex 
marriage, [and therefore] the states are now free to pass constitutionally 
valid laws for same-sex marriage.”170  Proponents of this theory assert that 
Australia’s Marriage Amendment Act should be interpreted in a similar way 
to DOMA in the United States; the federal legislation would regulate 
marriage only with respect to federal benefits, but state same-sex marriage 
laws would operate in a different and mutually exclusive field.171  If the 
Commonwealth Parliament does not execute or possess the authority to pass 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, then the field of same-sex marriage is 
left wide open to the states.   
Commonwealth Parliament would be unable to override or 
modify such legislation, since ex hypothesi, its power would not 
extend to the subject matter.  The word “marriage” would then 
have two different meanings in Australian law:  its meaning in 
the Constitution, confined to heterosexual marriage, and a 
broader meaning defined partly by State legislation.172 
Therefore, it is possible that the High Court would uphold the 
constitutionality of the Marriage Amendment Act but still allow states to 
enact legislation defining marriage with a broader meaning than is indicated 
in the commonwealth legislation.  
However, presuming that the Marriage Amendment Act is upheld 
constitutionally, the High Court will likely agree with the first argument; 
under the Marriage Amendment Act, states have no authority to pass 
contradictory same-sex marriage laws.  Section 109 of the constitution will 
be invoked to invalidate any state law that violates Parliament’s intention to 
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cover the field and be the exclusive source of law on the topic of defining 
marriage.  
A. Section 109 of the Constitution Allows for Broad Commonwealth 
Authority 
If Parliament exercises its power to legislate on matters regarding 
marriage, then section 109 of the constitution demands that such federal 
legislation supersede any conflicting state legislation.  “States retain 
legislative power in those subject matters not expressly granted to the 
Commonwealth Parliament by [section] 51. [Furthermore, section] 51(xxi) is 
a concurrent power meaning that the States as well as the Commonwealth 
have legislative power with respect to ‘marriage.’”173  If the commonwealth 
law has not occupied the field, a state law possibly would control not only in 
that state, but could bind the commonwealth to recognize same-sex 
marriages from that state as well. 
On the other hand, where federal legislation is inconsistent with state 
legislation, it renders the state legislation invalid, in accordance with section 
109 of the constitution.174  “‘Invalid,’ in this context, means ‘inoperative’ 
rather than void, meaning that inconsistent state legislation is revived if the 
overriding Commonwealth legislation is repealed.”175  However, it is beyond 
the powers of a state or territory “to enact laws, or to cause laws to operate, 
in a manner inconsistent with or repugnant to the laws of the paramount 
legislature.”176 
Section 109 has been interpreted broadly by the High Court in favor 
of commonwealth legislation.  State legislation will be deemed inconsistent 
and inoperative if (1) “it is impossible to obey both laws,” (2) “if one law 
purports to confer a legal right, privilege, or entitlement that the other law 
purports to take away or diminish . . . ,” or (3) “if the Commonwealth law 
shows a legislative intention to ‘cover the field’ [or] . . . be all the law there 
is on that topic.”177   
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B. Parliament Intended to Cover Marriage as a Matter Subject to 
Commonwealth Authority 
If one closely examines the language of the Australian amendment, it 
becomes clear that Parliament did not in fact specifically ban same-sex 
marriage.  The exact wording of the added provision in question reads, 
“marriage means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others, voluntarily entered into for life.”178  The phrase “to the exclusion of 
all others” is not set off from “the union of a man and a woman” by a 
comma and does not contain the word only.  Its plain meaning is that 
marriage is a union between a man and a woman and no other third party.  
“To the exclusion of all others” specifically applies to the union being 
between only two people.  The phrase does not refer back independently to 
the definition of marriage and therefore does not define marriage as being 
restricted to a heterosexual couple.  Unlike the language in the United States’ 
DOMA, which clearly stated that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,”179 the 
Australian law makes no such assertion that a union between a man and a 
woman is the only acceptable meaning.  Therefore, if a state passed 
legislation legalizing same-sex marriage, it technically would not be 
impossible to obey both laws.  The High Court could interpret that a 
marriage between two men does not violate the commonwealth definition, as 
there is no indication that marriage can only be defined narrowly.   
On the other hand, it is clear that Parliament had an intention to cover 
the field with the addition of specific language defining marriage.  The 
Marriage Act 1961 was fully functional and operational prior to the 
Amendment in 2004, which sought only to limit the definition of marriage to 
cover unions between a man and a woman.  The existence of the amendment 
itself is strong indication of Parliament’s intent.  The provisions added to the 
Marriage Amendment Act that expressly prohibit recognition of same-sex 
marriages solemnized in other nations is an indication that Parliament 
intended to prohibit any same-sex marriage solemnized in Australia as well. 
The Commonwealth’s legislative intention to cover the field gives strong 
indication that the High Court will determine that section 109 applies; any 
state laws that attempt to define marriage as other than between a man and a 
woman will be invalidated.  
The High Court has dealt with the issue of ascertaining the precise 
limits of the field that the commonwealth legislation intended to cover.  In 
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Viskauskas v. Niland,180 the court considered a suit that was brought in New 
South Wales arising from an incident in which three persons were allegedly 
refused service in a hotel bar on the grounds of their race.181  The 
complainants alleged unlawful discrimination based on race, in violation of 
the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.182  The commonwealth, 
however, also had legislation covering the same issue in the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975.183  In ruling that the section 109 of the constitution 
invalidates the sections of the New South Wales Act that are inconsistent 
with the commonwealth act, the court stated that the commonwealth cannot 
“admit the possibility that a State law might allow exceptions to the 
prohibitions of racial discrimination or might otherwise detract from the 
efficacy of the Commonwealth law.”184  The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
“deals with the subject of racial discrimination.”185  As such, the state 
antidiscrimination act was inoperable.   
By similar measure, the Marriage Amendment Act deals with the 
subject of marriage.  It is therefore likely that the High Court will use similar 
reasoning to conclude that any state legislation that attempts to undermine 
the commonwealth’s Act will be declared invalid by section 109.  Thus, if a 
state’s same-sex marriage law interferes with or allows exception to the 
commonwealth’s Marriage Amendment Act, and the Act is within 
Parliamentary authority, then state legislation allowing same-sex marriage 
likely would not stand. 
V. PROPONENTS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA SHOULD NOT 
ATTEMPT TO PASS STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS, BUT INSTEAD 
SHOULD PRESS FOR CIVIL UNIONS AND DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS 
Proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia should use a different 
tactical approach than proponents in the United States.  In the United States, 
proponents of same-sex marriage can advocate for state same-sex marriage 
laws without fear of triggering a Supreme Court decision holding that 
DOMA preempts state law.  Even though DOMA defines marriage as a 
union between a man and a woman, it applies exclusively to acts of 
Congress.  Therefore, a state law defining marriage as a union between two 
people does not technically conflict with DOMA. 
                                           
180
 Viskauskas v. Niland (1983) 153 C.L.R. 280. 
181
 Id. at 284. 
182
 Id.; Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 19 (Austl. NSW). 
183
 Viskauskas, 153 C.L.R. at 284; Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 9 (Austl. Cth). 
184
 Viskauskas, 153 C.L.R. at 292. 
185
 Id. 
164 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
In Australia, on the other hand, the scope of Parliament’s authority to 
define marriage under the Marriage Amendment Act is uncertain.  Because 
the constitution authorizes Parliament to pass laws with respect to marriage, 
arguably a commonwealth law defining marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman binds the states as well. 
As discussed above, in 2005, legislation providing for same-sex 
marriage was introduced in both New South Wales and Tasmania.186  
Undoubtedly, proponents of this legislation are in favor of same-sex 
marriage.  While pushing for state same-sex marriage is an effective way to 
change public perception in the United States, it is a dangerous approach for 
advocates of same-sex marriage in Australia. 
Australian state laws authorizing same-sex marriage arguably will 
conflict with the Marriage Amendment Act.  In hearing a case regarding this 
conflict, the High Court is likely to determine that Parliament does have the 
authority to pass legislation on the subject of same-sex marriage.  If it finds a 
conflict, therefore, the High Court will likely invalidate the state legislation.  
This action would leave Australians without the ability to enact same-sex 
marriage laws at the state level. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage in Australia may argue that by not 
pushing forward with state same-sex marriage laws, they are conceding in 
advance that the High Court will rule against them.  However, a decision by 
the High Court adverse to their position may be more damaging than just the 
prevention of same-sex marriage.  Currently, there is no serious 
commonwealth opposition to state de facto relationships.  However, Prime 
Minister Howard expressed his dissatisfaction with any recognition of same-
sex partnerships.187  The commonwealth’s interjection into the ACT 
government’s attempt to pass a civil-union law188 indicates that states may 
be bound by federal definitions.  If advocates of same-sex marriage were to 
force a decision before the High Court and lose, the loss might propel 
opponents of same-sex marriage to enact even stronger commonwealth 
legislation prohibiting rights for same-sex couples.  If the High Court 
extends the definition of marriage to include same-sex marriage, it could 
extend the definition of marriage to include all marriage-like entities.  If that 
happened, the Commonwealth Parliament could have the authority not only 
to prohibit states from passing same-sex marriage laws, but also could 
prohibit states from allowing civil unions or de facto partnerships. 
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As a result of the uncertain scope of Parliament’s authority to pass 
laws regarding marriage, supporters of same-sex marriage in Australia 
should proceed carefully.  A decision unfavorable to their position by the 
High Court likely would cripple their efforts to promote equality of benefits 
for same-sex couples.  However, currently, there is little opposition to states 
passing laws granting equal tangible state benefits.  At this point, therefore, 
instead of pushing for state same-sex marriage laws, Australians in favor of 
same-sex marriage should promote alternatives to same-sex marriage.  With 
a change in public perception, advocates may be able to convince Parliament 
to amend or repeal the Marriage Amendment Act.  A direct challenge, 
however, could be detrimental to the efforts to legalize marriage as a union 
between two people.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Marriage Amendment Act in Australia and the DOMA in the 
United States both define marriage as a union between a man and a woman.  
In the United States, this definition clearly extends only to marriage for 
federal purposes.  States, such as Massachusetts, have the power to enact 
same-sex marriage laws and to confer all of the state benefits of marriage to 
same-sex couples.  In Australia, however, the constitution gives Parliament 
express authority to pass laws on the subject of marriage.  Arguably, this 
means that Australian states and territories are precluded from passing same-
sex marriage laws.  If the High Court of Australia upholds the authority of 
Parliament to prohibit all same-sex marriages, opponents of same-sex 
marriage may encourage Parliament to pass even greater restrictions for 
same-sex couples in Australia.  Proponents of same-sex marriage, therefore, 
should not push for state same-sex marriage laws like those that have been 
introduced in Tasmania and New South Wales.  A direct state/commonwealth 
conflict of laws may trigger a High Court decision upholding the 
commonwealth’s authority to bind states to a scheme that embraces only 
opposite-sex marriage.  In order to achieve full marriage equality, 
Australians need to first change public perception through the passage of 
state civil unions and eventually lobby to convince Parliament to authorize 
same-sex marriage through commonwealth legislation. 
